

Training Analysis: The Shibboleth of Psychoanalytic Education

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I want to suggest that training analysis is a “shibboleth” in psychoanalytic education in the same way as Joseph Schachter (2002) proposed transference as a “shibboleth” in psychoanalytic theory. A shibboleth is a form of jargon that acts to distinguish insiders from outsiders. A shibboleth can be a distinctive pronunciation, a mode of dress, or form of behavior. A shibboleth is a slogan with only a veneer of truth. How this originally Hebrew word was pronounced was a matter of life and death around 1300 b.c.e. The pronunciation signaled whether someone was from one tribe or another. Those who could not pronounce the word “shibboleth” properly were slaughtered because they were seen to as being from the Ephramites, who could not pronounce the sound “sh,” instead saying “s” (Judges, 12:6). Although those without a “proper” training analysis are not physically slaughtered, there is a sense in which the training analysis acts as a shibboleth in psychoanalysis. It is seen as a major determinant of whether the analyst has been “properly” trained. What good reasons are there to validate a particular means of education as the distinguishing feature of the ends of psychoanalytic education? Schachter suggested that psychoanalysts are especially troubled by their professional identity because their practice encounters so much uncertainty. Thus psychoanalytic education enforces the professional identity as a defense or even fantasized bulwark against uncertainty. But it acts as a shibboleth in aiming to distinguish it from other approaches.

Freud originally suggested that dream interpretation was the shibboleth of psychoanalysis, distinguishing psychoanalysis from other modalities. As psychoanalysis developed beyond its origins, the transference replaced dream interpretation as a shibboleth.

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Schachter (2002) challenged whether transference can act as an authentic distinguishing feature (pp. 2-3).

Freud used the term “shibboleth” favorably. It reflected his attitude of mind. Freud made several references to “shibboleth” in a way that makes it appropriate to use this word to describe what came to take place in psychoanalytic education. In *The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*, Freud (1914) referred to dreams as “the shibboleth of psychoanalysis” (p. 57). In 1923 he saw “the first shibboleth of psychoanalysis” to be the concept of the unconscious—that which distinguishes psychoanalysis from other approaches (Freud, 1923, p. 13). Jones cited Freud writing to Pfister that the shibboleth of psychoanalysis was the theme of sexuality, distinguishing it from the Zurich School (Jones, 1957, p. 15) and also Freud saying that the Oedipus complex was the psychoanalytic shibboleth: “Recognition of it has become the shibboleth that distinguishes supporters of psychoanalysis from their opponents” (Jones, 1955, p. 326). At the beginning of his *New Introductory Lectures*, Freud (1933) referred to his theory of dreams again as a shibboleth. It was “what is most characteristic and peculiar about the young science... . The strangeness of the assertions it was obliged to put forward has made it play the part of a shibboleth, the use of which decided who could become a follower of psycho-analysis and to whom it remained for ever incomprehensible” (p. 8). Freud (1933) avowed that the theory of dreams even performed the role of a “sheet-anchor” in difficult times. “Whenever I began to have doubts of the correctness of my wavering conclusions, the successful transformation of a senseless and muddled dream into a logical and intelligible mental process in the dreamer would renew my confidence of being on the right track” (p. 8). Not only did it sort the sheep from

the goats but also, as a good shibboleth, provided Freud with reassurance from doubt. For the 35 years between the publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams* and his *New Introductory Lectures* the theory served as an effective test that sorted followers from the doubters who would never see the psychoanalytic light.

Whether valid or not, this statement is reminiscent of the hyperbolic language of religious cults, sects, movements, and “the cause,” instead of science. Freud was intent on staking out the turf

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of psychoanalysis. His professed aim of seeking truth existed alongside but arguably secondarily to his immense preoccupation with sorting “ins” and “outs,” of knowing who was or was not a psychoanalyst. Too seldom did he reach out to connect with others with a different perspective, or to take their criticism seriously. Valuable examples of dialogue are with Oskar Pfister in relation to religion (*The Future of an Illusion*), Romain Rolland on the “oceanic feeling” (*Civilization and its Discontents*), and Albert Einstein (*Why War?*). Even here, I don't think he listened so much as used these exchanges as ways of enhancing his own arguments. Notwithstanding Freud's overplaying his hand with his diatribes against religion, it could be argued that Freud's orientation may have been adaptive in his own creative development of theories. But unfortunately, this stance set the model, style, and tone for other contemporary and future psychoanalysts in future debate both within the psychoanalytic field and with those outside it. Dogmatism paired with sectarianism even as exciting new theories were sometimes developing. There was respect for some difference, yes, but only within certain leader-defined limits. Schisms and schismatic thinking have abounded. Too often has there been the seeming refrain: Are you with us or against us?

Louis Breger (2009) has suggested recently that Freud's desire for an overarching single theory, his rejection of colleagues' views that were critical of his own, his focus on the Oedipus complex as a shibboleth, and other cult-like behaviors were based on his personal “need to be a great man; it was the basis of all the other problems with his theories and approaches to therapy” (p. 117). Breger suggested:

Freud's childhood identification with military leaders was crucial to the way he shaped the movement. He envisioned himself as the commander of a psychoanalytic army that was surrounded by enemies against whom he and his loyal lieutenants must battle. How different things would have been if, instead of a cult-like “cause,” psychoanalysis had really been the science that it claimed to be, a field in which new ideas and methods were examined, tested against observations, and welcomed when they proved fruitful in producing further research and more effective therapy. But that was not to be. (p. 114)

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I would add that Freud's drive for undying fame differed from celebrity. He did not want to be famous only for the sake of being lauded. He wanted to achieve something that merited being famous, something I think at least of the order of being awarded a Triumph in Ancient Rome (and not merely an Ovation). He wanted recognition for achievement, as having deliberately and determinedly sustained and shaped a new understanding of the self and the world that would make a significant difference. The separation of the concepts of ‘mental’ from ‘conscious’ would “disturb the peace of the world, signifying that “the ego is not even master in its own house” and engendering “the general revolt against our science” (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 285). That new understanding was so immensely significant in his eyes as to inflict a still greater blow to human narcissism than had the revolutions of Copernicus and Darwin. That considerable claim was built upon a big wish. That was the league that Freud wanted to be in, one which necessitated a major idea that brought about a paradigm shift. This search involved a mind-set that would implement a broad-ranging campaign, akin to a military campaign on a number of fronts, including public relations and the development of worldwide centers. Unlike Copernicus and Darwin, however, this concept went far beyond an individual scientist, Freud, and was more like the foundation of a church. It involved a movement of like-minded visionaries who practiced “our science” and produced their own institutions.

Singular universal explanations and shibboleths are critically assessed in universities, at least in principle. Given his big wish, it is not surprising that Freud rejected the route through universities of normal academic disciplines where he might

have been first among equals and not in command with a single, overarching, all-encompassing theory in the psychological sciences. Instead he established a freestanding movement of internally focused cliques run by its own generals, or perhaps secular cardinals. From the Wednesday Society onward there was a kind of university atmosphere within the societies, but only on certain conditions. This atmosphere could sometimes exist provided that the Professor or other authorities had the last word and that certain established ideological boundaries or shibboleths were not violat

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ed (such as the central importance of sexuality or the Oedipus complex), where sorting the “ins” from the “outs” then overrode freedom and became paramount. The role of humanistic education is not necessarily incompatible with such limits—for example, seminaries can be scholarly institutions and can entertain more or less debate, especially around the interpretation of given texts or doctrine. One important, effective method for replication for Freud's movement has been via the training analysis, which has historically entrenched authoritarianism rather than challenging it. The caste of training analysts became the carrier of the science.

The training analysis has come to play a particular independent and dominant role in psychoanalytic education when it makes more sense for the educational system to have it play a far lesser role, a role that serves as a means to an end in serving the general aims of psychoanalytic education that are closely interconnected with the scientific aspects of the psychoanalytic discipline. It carries with it a quasi-mystical magical role way beyond any explicit function. I have long puzzled as to why training analysis and the role of training analyst came to have such a high status and aura, occupying such a central role in the identity of being a psychoanalyst. I have described the process of “anointment” of training analysts as akin to the Biblical laying on of psychoanalytic hands. I chronicled the pivotal role played by anointment in the political histories of psychoanalytic institutes in the United States. The idea of an esoteric pipeline to knowledge has been intrinsic to all psychoanalytic schools. In *Unfree Associations*, I proposed (Kirsner 2009) a fundamental reason:

Anointment and genealogy fill a vacuum created by uncertainty in the field. Instead of developing through an accumulation of evidence, psychoanalytic knowledge is often assumed to develop via a pipeline to certain people with supposed knowledge. Those purported to have the truth pass on the torch to select members of the next generation. For a qualification to be conferred, a level of skill and knowledge is assumed, an assumption that is not really warranted. Therefore, the gap between real knowledge and presumed, 'pretend' knowledge is filled through particular "anointed" peo-pie. (p. 13)

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The right to train through the training analysis role is the special enigmatic vehicle putatively filling the gap between the level of actual knowledge and the much higher claimed level of knowledge enshrined in the qualification of psychoanalyst. But that role is filled in an idealizing, religious and ritualistic manner far removed from all but self-serving definitions of science (see Kirsner, 2009, p. 232ff.).

Early psychoanalytic education was very different from what it is today. For the first twenty years of psychoanalysis in Europe there were no training Institutes and no mandatory training analysis, and a much longer time elapsed before there were “training analysts.” Before the 1920s formal psychoanalytic training did not exist. Psychoanalytic societies were scientific clubs with no accredited schools or curricula. The teaching approach was student centered and individually oriented. Psychoanalytic training originally took one to one and a half years, and gradually increased (Balint, 1948, p. 167). Freud's recommendation for what was called “didactic analysis” did not define its duration and included analyses lasting only a few weeks. Although Freud recommended that candidates undertake an analysis, he did not think it should be mandated. Freud took a didactic approach in his analysis of candidates. It was clearly flexible, an adjustment of the analysis for the kinds of teaching purposes I have described—a sampling for the student to gain a feel for what psychoanalysis was like and awareness of “blind spots.” It was not intended just for students, as Freud consulted with many analysts from other countries in addition to the students who visited him in Vienna.

Without resorting to general rules, Freud was teaching analysis at an individual level. Understanding this form of teaching became a problem only with the later mainstream standpoint of regarding the long training analysis as therapeutic rather than as for didactic purposes. One form of understanding the idea of the first analysis being “for the institute” and the second for yourself would be to see it as didactic, short, and only incidentally therapeutic. However, that is not how the training analysis developed. Training analysis became longer as well as mutative in intent and became the master instead of the servant of psychoanalytic education. Through reporting, it was used politically as a means of con

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trol instead of liberation. But once reporting was discontinued, it remained informally as the primary means of transmission. It lost its role as didactic form, which was peculiar to the early days. Bern-feld recalled that Freud

adjusted the duration of the analysis and the amount of straight teaching included in it according to the wishes and the circumstances of the student-patient and according to the nature of the neurotic complaints. Whenever he deemed it advisable, he included didactic material in the personal analysis. With many of his students he discussed psychoanalytic theory, their own patients, the politics of the young group, and the papers they intended to write. In general, he tended to let the analysis grow into a relationship between two colleagues, one of whom happened to know a little more than the other. From the first to the very end, Freud kept his didactic cases absolutely free from interference by rules, administrative directives, or political considerations. His teaching was completely student-centered ... or more simply he acted as a psychoanalyst should. He continued this long after the establishment of institutes, to the dismay and embarrassment of “the authorities,” as he sometimes, and a little ironically, referred to them. (1962, p. 462)

The mandate during the 1920s for a didactic analysis as part of psychoanalytic training should be seen within the context in which the psychoanalysis was potentially short and therefore relatively nonintrusive. It demanded little of the candidate, being more in the nature of a sampling of psychoanalysis. Nonetheless, there were strong and principled arguments against mandating even this, on the basis that personal psychoanalysis should be left up to the candidate and should not be connected with an institute. An analysis was not even a requirement in the New York Psychoanalytic Society until 1937, when it became a requirement for future training in the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. Although the requirement did not question the qualifications of the American psychoanalysts, it was occasioned by the reactions to the contemporary influx of European psychoanalysts, some of whom were training analysts who had not had personal analyses. Not co-incidentally, the same year saw the American Federation of Psychoanalysis—a forerunner of the American Psychoanalytic Association in which the New York Psychoanalytic Society was the most prominent member—declaring to international and European

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societies that, as Sandor Lorand (1969) put it, “the American societies would not recognize membership in foreign psychoanalytic societies as fulfilling requirements for membership in an American Society. This was a decided irritation to the many immigrants who settled in New York. All had to apply for membership” (p. 593). These requirements were designed to try to ensure that the Americans kept the upper hand—they were an aspect of the decidedly cool reception accorded many emigres by the Americans, who feared being taken over by the Europeans. This exemplifies how new rules and regulations may be inspired primarily by political and economic considerations.

Even given Freud's international standing, his direct power decreased with the distance from Vienna. The approach in Vienna was quite different from that in Berlin where a *Poliklinik*, established in 1920, became the center of training. The Viennese were interested in the application of psychoanalysis to all fields of therapy and education, whereas the Berlin tendency was to establish psychoanalysis as a medical specialty isolated from other fields. According to Freud, the Berlin Institute was set up with three goals in mind; first

to make our therapy accessible to the great multitude who suffer under their neuroses no less than the wealthy, but who are not in a position to meet the cost of their treatment. Secondly, it seeks to provide a centre at which psychoanalysis can be taught theoretically and at which the experience of older psychoanalysts can be handed on to pupils who are anxious to learn. And lastly, it aims at perfecting our knowledge of neurotic illness and our therapeutic technique by applying them and testing them under fresh conditions. (Freud, 1930, p. 257. See also Freud,

Making psychoanalytic therapy accessible to the masses was an important aim and part of the contemporary ethos (see Danto, 2005). So was the fact that the material gathered was used in a ten-year research study at the Berlin Institute. Bernfeld (1962) recollected: "As a compromise, the clinics in Vienna and Berlin decided to include in their program some provisions for the training of nonphysicians. But with greater and greater intensity their purpose came to be the issuing of diplomas in psychoanalysis. In the long run, the Berlin tendency won out" (p. 467). Abram Kardiner

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(1963) also blamed the structure of the Berlin Institute for authoritarianism endemic to psychoanalysis: "My criticism of the Berlin School and all of its ilk for what happened between 1921 and today is that they consolidate an arbitrary system into a monolithic unbreakable structure which has to remain as it is or fall totally."

The German term for the process of training analysis was *Lehranalyse*, ("teaching analysis"), often translated as "didactic analysis." "Didactic" is a term that has meaning, especially in Germany, deriving from ancient Greece (Körner, 2002). It refers to the teaching and learning aspects of the educational process. It was an integral part of the educational system, not meant to dominate it like a tail wagging a dog.

"Teaching" and "training" have different meanings. Teaching is part of a broadening, critical educational experience, as in the German idea of *Bildung*, or liberal education As Jurgen Körner (2002) commented,

There is no attempt to achieve defined and operationalisable professional qualifications. The relationship between teacher and pupil is characterised by authority and trust. A psychoanalytic education by means of a "liberal education" is based upon the assumption that the student should be motivated and supported in achieving competence through a passionate study of the world of psychic reality. (p. 1395)

The cultural context of the origins and early history of psychoanalysis was, as Rose (1998) has observed,

"a calling—an inward commitment and, in Max Weber's words, a "life-task." In the view of Freud and the Viennese, their calling belonged as much to culture as to psychology... . From the founding of the society at the turn of the century to its forced disintegration under the Anschluss in 1938, Freud and his followers defined the comprehensive exploration of culture as one of their fundamental pursuits." (p. 112)

The Interpretation of Dreams to Civilization and Its Discontents marked a "collective odyssey" in which "Viennese Freudians remained conscious of themselves as the vanguard of a new cultural, as well as psychological, vocation" (p. 11). The idea of *Bildung* involved humanist self-education, inner transformation, character devel

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opment, and cultural expression. Freud's (1926) idea of psychoanalytic training involving branches of knowledge went way beyond medicine into "the history of civilization, mythology, the psychology of religion and the science of literature" (p. 246).

In contrast, the idea of training has a more professionalizing bent. Roy Grinker, Sr., (1979) pointed out that in psychoanalytic institutes in the United States the term "education" has been equivalent to "training" and that this "early set the climate for a technological approach rather than a graduate education in an academic environment" (p. 173). As John Gedo (1984) wrote, "Psychoanalytic education will have undergone a real revolution only when it ceases to concern itself with the training, or even the veritable instruction, of neophytes and becomes, as education has become in the better departments of the elite universities, the advancement of knowledge by the continuous intellectual growth of every participant" (p. 178).

Historically, the *Lehranalyse* was not a major issue. At the 1918 Budapest Congress of the IPA, Hermann Nunberg, with the approval of Freud, suggested training analyses for those in psychoanalytic training. However, the meaning of this was not

what came to pass later. According to Bertram Lewin (1962), "This was no more than terminological recognition—a statement of a fact well understood—that the personal analysis was an educational procedure, and that persons who had been analyzed had also received education" (pp. 121-122). Having a personal analysis was ipso facto educational. The short didactic analysis did not need to be therapeutic. As Reeder (2004) put it, "Didactic analysis did not need to be as 'deep' or thoroughgoing as a therapeutic analysis. This conception differs with abundant clarity from anything that would later be emphasized, namely the specific demands on any didactic analysis that it should be 'deep' and precisely concentrate upon character formation" (p. 96). Alongside Bernfeld and others from the "old school," Abram Kardiner (1963) suggested that the training analysis "doesn't educate—it only indoctrinates—it doesn't perform the function it's supposed to" (p. 12). Kardiner would eliminate the training analysis and "leave it exactly in the form in which Freud left it—six months to a year of sampling" (p. 12). If there are severe personal problems, Kardin

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er advised that the candidate be sent to a therapeutic analysis with someone outside.

In summary, originally, training analysis played a secondary role in psychoanalytic education. The analyst-in-training was analyzed so as to iron out blind spots and get a sense of what psychoanalysis was like. The training analysis was also short and dealt with symptoms, small and large. However, the short psychoanalysis, which was an addition, came to occupy center stage—the secondary role became primary, and vice versa. As psychoanalytic education became more formalized, the role of the training analysis grew larger. Analysis developed into a far longer and mutative regimen, that is, one sufficiently "deep" that the personality of the analysand was to be changed. These two different forms morphed together, and the didactic analysis evolved from being ancillary to achieve an independent powerful status in its own right as the ritual carrier of esoteric knowledge. Psychoanalytic candidates increasingly came to be seen and even saw themselves as children who knew little, sitting at the couch of those who knew. It traveled further away from being a collective voyage of discovery.

According to Bernfeld (1962), Freud's illness in 1923 and 1924 precipitated a bureaucratic turn. With his illness many psychoanalysts

grew intensely anxious because of the threatened loss, and became very eager to establish a solid dam against heterodoxy, as they now felt themselves responsible for the future of psychoanalysis. They determined to limit by rigid selection among the newcomers, and by the institution of a coercive, long drawn-out trial period of authoritarian training, any final admission to their societies. In fact, they punished their students for their own ambivalence. At the same time, they consolidated the one trend that Freud always had wanted to avoid: the shrinkage of psychoanalysis into an annex of psychiatry. (p. 467)

Although historical factors conditioned the particular manner in which psychoanalytic training would be carried out, particular practices became increasingly transmuted into being essential in their own right. Short, preparatory, mandatory psychoanalyses to give the trainee a taste of psychoanalysis and which had relatively little effect on the rest of the training lengthened into a

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situation where the many years on the couch assumed primary significance.

Training analyst status became important in the US institutes in contrast to Europe where there were no official lists of training analysts in the Vienna and Berlin Institutes. There, as Lewin and Ross (1960) noted,

some individual on the Training (or Education) Committee usually referred or assigned an applicant for training to one or another member of the local society, and for a time it was assumed tacitly that any member could serve as a training analyst. The student's judgment or his adviser usually took him to an analyst of reputation. In America, the matter was rather vague for a while. Only some years after the founding of the first American institutes was it decided to have official lists of training analysts. (p. 31)

They went on to observe that the “charisma” of the training analyst as a notable and the “lists” that denominated him or her as an official arose because of the American conditions. These conditions included the issue of accrediting the status of those Americans returning from psychoanalysis in Europe, who were regarded as more prestigious than those trained in America, even though officially their individual quality was difficult to establish (Lewin & Ross, 1960, p. 32). This would not have been sufficient to make the route taken in the United States the only one. Another issue was far more important.

During the 1920s there were severe doubts by state authorities about psychoanalysis, so the establishment of official bodies with the name “Institute” (rather than “Society” for example), together with state licensure, letterheads, a Board of Directors, and a permanent address were reassuring to medical authorities, who could be satisfied that “professional” rather than amateur education was taking place in psychoanalysis (Lewin & Ross, 1960, p. 33). Rather than being skeptical of these moves, psychoanalysts welcomed them. The issues of lists and the charisma of training analysts were steps along the way toward bureaucratization and professionalization of psychoanalysis in the United States.

The appointment of experienced psychoanalysts to fulfill a training task eventually became transmuted into an additional accreditation—it became a powerful position rather than a specific

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function within the educational system. Training analysts have the right to analyze candidates for the rest of their lives—or, increasingly, until the age of seventy. It is possible for training analysts not to teach seminars, and they only analyze candidates. But there is no specific or intrinsic difference between how candidates and ordinary patients are analyzed. Nonetheless, there are two classes of psychoanalysts.

From my studies on conflict and splits in psychoanalytic institutes I concluded that ideological splits and conflicts often were rooted in the issue of the right to train, who appoints whom, and who is a training analyst (Kirsner, 2009). My studies agreed with Jacob Arlow's observation in 1972:

It is disturbing but true that most of the conflicts have originated over who shall have the right to train, that is, who shall be training analyst. The tensions emanating from the division of colleagues into two categories of psychoanalysts, training analysts and just plain psychoanalysts, intrude themselves into the organizational and scientific life of the institutes. This is an ever-present problem, and its impact is accentuated by the aura of special status which surrounds the position of training analyst, a position endowed with charismatic implications. The training analyst is regarded as possessing the psychoanalytic equivalent of omniscience. It is from the training analyst that candidates claim their descent. In many places the professional career of an individual may be determined by who his training analyst was. Greenacre referred to some of this in her study of the so-called 'convoy' phenomenon, that is, the situation of the psychoanalytic candidate who is safely guided through his professional training under the protection of some influential training analyst. (p. 559)

As Bernfeld (1962) observed,

we possess no way by which we can rationally rank the membership into Good, Very Good and The Best psychoanalysts. Yet strangely, that is exactly what has taken place. The membership of all our groups is divided into members who are good enough for the simple paying patient and into really good ones who take care of our future membership. (p. 481)

However, the selection of the “really good ones,” today as ever, does not necessarily relate to psychoanalytic ability. As Kernberg (1986) noted in his classic paper on psychoanalytic institutes

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and education, “It is an open secret that the appointment of training analysts is politically motivated, that the actual qualifications of the training analyst may be less important than his or her reliability with regard to local politics” (p. 805). Kernberg viewed this situation as “corruptive” and regarded the view that such organizational maneuvers are an unavoidable repetition of “family life” through sibling rivalry, “primal scene” material, and so on, as rationalization. He rightly argued that ‘the failure to make a distinction between an educational institution and a family reflects a failure to

develop and preserve an organizational structure that is oriented to the tasks to be performed. Such a failure directly causes paranoiagenic deterioration of the institution's social life and functions" (p. 805). Kernberg questioned the lack of explicit and public criteria for the selection of training analysts and accountability for the decision making:

The formal locus and the real locus of decision-making are often very different. The policy of "gently tapping" selected graduates, rather than explicit encouragement for manifestation of interest on the part of candidates for training analyst appointments, illustrates the social hypocrisy surrounding such appointments, which poisons the atmosphere of psychoanalytic institutes. (p. 805)

Bernfeld (1962) argued:

The training analyst is not, as Freudian method demands, a mere transference figure. He is instead a part of the patient's reality, a powerful and even decisive factor in it. Such a glaring deviation from the classical technique may sometimes be desirable in cases of nonclassic structure... but these cases will rarely be suitable material. Our system does not even permit the analyst to modify the regulations under which he works. He must take a judge's attitude in every case. By policy and circumstance, the institutionalized training analysis thus bears the features of a non-Freudian technique. (p. 476)

Although the training analysis was among other things originally a means of screening candidates, there are now other methods of screening. Most psychoanalytic institutes have officially abandoned reporting. In such circumstances the training analysis cannot act as a means of screening out those considered unsuitable. The requirement of supervised casework provides the institution

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with an opportunity of assessing the candidate's psychoanalytic capability. Bernfeld (1962) made it clear that the training analysis was intended to support orthodoxy.

The personal analysis is no barrier against heterodoxy. The inventors of our training system, who had set such anxious hopes in its preventive force, have been definitely proven wrong. It seems quite sufficient for our point if we list only some of the former trainees of the Berlin Institute: Alexander, Rado, Horney, Fromm, Reich, Fromm-Reichmann. (pp. 476-477)

Eisold (1997) developed this point further in suggesting that in psychoanalytic societies the

real allegiances of their members are to their analysts and to the lineages of analysts that define particular schools of thought. Thus, because dependency upon one's analyst has traditionally been thought a sign of unresolved transference, the way to ensure one's place in the lineage, one's secure relationship with one's analyst and his school, has been to be willing to fight on his behalf. Moreover, in doing so, one is able to project into the rival school one's own displaced fear and hatred of the leader. (p. 101)

Eisold suggested that the threat to psychoanalysis was not an internal enemy but "the unacknowledged dependencies of analysts themselves" (p. 101). Shibboleths of course court and spawn such dependencies.

When Freud originally suggested that there should be training for psychoanalysts as a "psychoanalytic purification" in 1912, he was referring to the need for analysts to recognize their blind spots in the countertransference. This is clear as Freud (1912) suggests that the analyst would thereby "become aware of those complexes of his own which would be apt to interfere with his grasp of what the patient tells him." These would have a "disqualifying effect": "every unresolved repression in him constitutes ... a 'blind spot'" (p. 116). This was a practical recommendation at a time when analyses were very brief and training was informal. This was not a suggestion for a mandated mutative supertherapy to provide the lynchpin for a long, complex formal training program. This recommendation at that time was far from being a shibboleth for psychoanalytic education. In 1937, almost at the end of his life, Freud considered the main tasks of the training analysis:

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For practical reasons this analysis can only be short and incomplete. Its main object is to enable his teacher to make a judgement as to whether the candidate can be accepted for further training. It has accomplished its purpose if it gives the learner a firm conviction of the existence

of the unconscious, if it enables him, when repressed material emerges, to perceive in himself things which would otherwise be incredible to him, and if it shows him a first sample of the technique which has proved to be the only effective one in analytic work. (p. 248)

He thought that analysts could not be purified by the process of their analysis, so much so that an analyst should “at intervals of five years or so—submit himself to analysis once more ... [H]is own analysis would change from a terminable into an interminable task” (Freud, 1937, p. 249). Kairys (1964) reported that, in contrast, by 1964 “training analyses are aimed at resolution of complex characterological problems and last several years” (p. 505).

Bernfeld (1962) thought training analysis was greatly overrated as a means of overcoming such blind spots. It was not essential for recognizing transference reactions and it provided little or no knowledge or skill for the prospective analyst (pp. 477, 478, 469). Many stated reasons for mandating long training psychoanalyses were found wanting. Contemporary training psychoanalyses perpetuate blind spots in the maintenance of the idealization of one's own training analyst, the figure of Freud, and the received body of knowledge of psychoanalysis (Kernberg, 1986, p. 818). Thomä (1993) commented that the post-Freud supertherapy involving “the psychoanalytic purification, when it goes beyond giving insight into personal complexes, seemingly can lead to even greater, systematic blind spots” (p. 47). He wondered whether “it is precisely the many-years-long training analyses which, in the various schools and orientations, lead to one-sidedness, to systematic restrictions in perception, so that personal blind spots are replaced by common ones specific to schools” (p. 47).

The problems inherent in a training analysis in a psychoanalytic institute were succinctly expressed by Anna Freud in 1938 and have changed little:

It would be viewed as a gross technical error if an analyst accepted as his patients persons from his close social environment, if he were to share his interests or opinions with them, if he were to discuss

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them in their presence; if he were to criticize and judge their behavior and discuss it with others and would permit himself to draw realistic consequences from his judgment; if he were to intervene actively in his patients' lives and offer himself as an example to them, and permit them at the end of the psychoanalysis the identification with himself, and his professional activity. The training analyst commits every one of these gross technical errors in the framework of the psychoanalytic training situation. It remains an as yet unanswered question how much the transference situation of the training analysis is complicated and obscured by this technically deviating procedure. One hears again and again among psychoanalysts the complaint that the psychoanalysis of the future analyst fails to succeed therapeutically as well as the psychoanalysis of most neurotic patients. Many psychoanalysts suffer from unresolved infantile attitudes which disturb them in their affective relationship with their environment, or from unresolved transference fixations to their training analyst, or which influence their scientific attitudes. They remain in a state of dependence on their training analyst, or else they separate from him in a violent revolt against the unresolved positive relationship. This is often accompanied by clamorous, hostile, though theoretically rationalized declarations. (A. Freud, quoted in Kairys, 1964, pp. 486-487)

New York analyst David Kairys expanded on the basic contradiction that Anna Freud pointed out. For Anna Freud the resolution of the patient's identification with the analyst in a therapeutic analysis comes through the interpretation of the infantile roots of the identification.

The analysand is thus brought to recognize the unreal character of the identification and can turn his energies to his own life interests. In the training analysis this cannot happen since identification with the analyst takes place in reality and the infantile and real determinants of the identification become fused. The patient in therapeutic analysis ends by becoming independent of the analyst and separating his fate from that of the analyst, while the candidate at the end of training connects his future with that of the analyst by becoming his colleague and sometimes his collaborator. This fact must affect the success of any training analysis and sometimes has produced cliques and factions within psychoanalytic groups. (Kairys, 1964, p. 501)

In 1964 Kairys thought it was “time to ask ourselves some hard questions” about the training analysis. He asked if it was justified to make students invest a great deal of time, effort, and money in

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an analysis which is flawed from the start—was it right to ask training analysts to conduct psychoanalyses with “so many built-in hazards.” Kairys finally asked if the profession is being served “by continuing a system of training which, we believe, leaves many students unsuccessfully analyzed and in need of further psychoanalysis after graduation” (p. 508). Of course, there have been a large number of technical suggestions to ameliorate the situation. But Kairys felt that “we have an obligation to seek answers that go beyond mere tinkering with the details of the present system” (p. 508).

Bernfeld proposed the dismantling the whole system of psychoanalytic education, which had become so bureaucratized as to have lost the spirit and passion of psychoanalysis, which he thought belonged to the early pioneers. The formal system would be replaced by a totally informal system that would be student centered. There would be no formal requirements about previous training. All the committees on admission, education, and students would be abolished, as would the category of “training analyst.” When an analyst spotted somebody who was interested, talented, and passionately interested in psychoanalysis, this person would be brought to meetings and seminars, meet psychoanalysts, receive supervision, and maybe present a paper to the society. The student, through interest and passion, would be likely to be eager to undertake an analysis. After a while, the student would have met and mingled with the members of the society, who could decide whether or not to accept the student as an analyst. Bernfeld suggested that this would certainly be no more problematic than the present system and would have the advantage of excluding “extra-psychoanalytic considerations.”

In 1964 Kairys suggested a complete separation of the training analyst from the institute. In 1920 the first training analyst, Hanns Sachs, by invitation from the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society, moved from Vienna to Berlin so as to analyze analysts without being part of the local psychoanalytic scene (Bernfeld, 1962, p. 464). Kairys suggested that adopting the separation of training analysis and education, where all that is known is that the patient has commenced psychoanalysis with an accredited training analyst, would solve many of the problems of the training analysis, though it

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would still leave a number unsolved. Graduation would occur through reports from supervisors and instructors only:

When the reports of his supervisors indicate that he is able to conduct an analysis in a satisfactory way and seems from his supervised work to have an adequate grasp of the principles of psychoanalytic theory and practice, and when he has completed all of his courses, he is graduated. The question of the completion of his personal psychoanalysis remains a matter between him and his training analyst. The training analysis in this way becomes free from the hampering effects caused by the dual function of the analyst. (Kairys, 1964, p. 508)

Kernberg's approach (1986) was similar to that of Kairys. Kernberg opposed psychoanalysts reporting and suggested that at most all that should be conveyed to the Education Committee is the date of the beginning of the psychoanalysis, the number of sessions per month or year, and when the psychoanalysis is either interrupted or completed (p. 831). On the educational side he suggested that functional authority be given over to instructors who teach and supervise. According to Kernberg, this “would go a long way toward reducing the pathological idealization of training analysts. The students would know that their progress depends on performance in classes and under supervision, on an open interchange with their teachers” (p. 829). On Kernberg's model, training analyst status would be a task of analyzing rather than a sinecure with power in other areas.

The mandate of an essentially voluntary activity has many deleterious consequences which, by the nature of the structure of the analysis, are irresolvable. Zvi Lothane (2007) has gone further in asserting that it is even unethical to mandate a training analysis. No doubt a psychoanalyst who had not experienced analysis would be missing an essential internship, which may involve personal analysis completely separate from the institute. But then this implies the abolition of a caste of those with the right to conduct analysis, except in the broadest possible terms (e.g., analysts require five years experience beyond graduation; analysts must be registered with the state or authority or umbrella organization).

Freud (1937) famously regarded psychoanalysis as, following government and education, the third “impossible profession” (p.

248). The combination of psychoanalysis with education together produces, as former IPA president Edward Joseph put it, "impossibility squared! And I think oftentimes the results show" (personal communication, 1981). Psychoanalytic educators have been aware that these fields often conflict with each other. In their survey of psychoanalytic education in the United States carried out in 1960, half a century ago, Lewin and Ross (1960) refer to a syncretistic position, that is, one which uses conflicting and irreconcilable assumptions (pp. 46-47). According to Lewin and Ross, psychoanalytic education and psychoanalytic procedure exist in two worlds:

the two models "psychoanalytic patient" and "student" complement, alternate with, and oppose each other. A psychoanalytic treatment is sui generis. The education introduces a parameter for the therapeutic procedure, and the analytic procedure an even larger one for the education. The institutes are unavoidably trying to exert two effects on the student: to "educate" him and to "cure" or "change" him. Hence the student as a phenomenon fits into two conceptual frameworks: he is the pedagogic unit or object of teaching and the therapeutic unit or object of psychoanalytic procedure. (p. 47)

Moreover, these two different frameworks often involve one person, the training analyst. This problem was not recently discovered. In her paper to the 1927 Innsbruck Congress of the IPA, Helene Deutsch (1983) said that the training analyst is often in a conflicting role because of "the double task which the training analyst usually has to perform. The first is the therapeutic aim which must be fulfilled in almost all didactic cases; the other relates to his responsibility as a teacher. These two aims, that of the therapist and that of the teacher, often contradict each other" (p. 60).

A major problem for psychoanalytic institutes is deciding which educational model to adopt: Are they there to train practitioners in technique or should the institute be, as Philip Holzman (1976) suggested, "a center for scholarly activities in psychoanalysis, including research, disputation, and interdisciplinary exchanges, as well as training for the skill of psychoanalyzing?" (p. 253). The practitioner model has dominated psychoanalytic institutions as, from Freud onward, they have generally been based in independent, freestanding institutes and not in universities.

This is no accident. Once Freud rejected the route through universities, the die was cast. The importance of this decision to the history and politics of the psychoanalytic movement cannot be overemphasized in terms of its far-reaching consequences across the field. Structurally, freestanding institutions were answerable only to their leaders. Leadership involved internal cliques accountable to no one outside the institution, often not even to the membership—unlike a university, which has protocols of academic standards, evaluation, and discourse. When Freud was alive, it was possible to defer to his judgment, to that of his close colleagues, such as members of the "committee." But generationally, how would the word be passed down? The answer lay in the training analysis as an esoteric pipeline, restricted to analytic "descendants" of the original circle of the school involved, quintessentially that of Freud, but applying to other schools such as those of Jung, Klein, and Lacan. (Other schools have their own pipelines of descent, such as Klein, Jung, Lacan, etc.). The connection established was private, not publicly assessable. Even though the analysis was only one means toward discovering knowledge about the unconscious and human nature, the analysis was elevated into the major avenue of transmission to new generations in psychoanalytic education. The form of the analysis and who conducted it became more important than what knowledge the student could demonstrate.

Freud's concept of freestanding institutes or associations of freestanding institutes under his direction meant a clear separation of "us" from "them." He brooked dissent only up to a certain point. Freud was a complex person who valued both science and free thought (albeit in a context, as evidenced by the Fundamental Rule of free association for the psychoanalytic patient) as well as undermining it institutionally. He was supportive of the Berlin Institute's research program and the idea of the *Lehrenanalyse* to "refine the future analyst's mental capacities" or "enrich the personality." Reeder (2004) thought it "clear that at least during the first ten years of the Berlin Institute the view of training analysis did not conform with what today would be regarded as 'psychoanalysis proper'" (p. 96). But notwithstanding this, Freud was

very authoritarian. He set up a secret "Committee" to sustain the cause,

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giving its members rings, and excluded from the movement opponents such as Adler, Jung, and Wilhelm Reich. As I suggested in this journal twenty years ago, Freud was both an explorer and a codifier who wanted to set up a psychoanalytic profession of "lay curers of souls who need not be doctors and should not be priests" (Freud & Pfister, 1928, p. 28). On the one hand, he opened a new realm; on the other he sought to push forward a movement of professionals (Kirsner, 1990). Eschewing the university model, psychoanalysis came to be run by cliques of insiders against outsiders. The special type of training involving a training analysis increasingly marked the territory of the distinctive psychoanalytic approach from more general educational methods. Training was within a unique established paradigm, and the training analysis evolved into the special path to knowledge and experience that set analysts apart. Although other disciplines use similar methods to attain knowledge, the shibboleth of the training analysis demonstrated an esoteric quasi-religious line to knowledge, not subject to the normal academic protocols of university-based disciplines.

So long as the movement was small and Freud was its clear and active leader, many major decisions could be made by him as final arbiter or by some of his trusted colleagues. As the psychoanalytic movement increased in size and spread, given the rise of Nazism and the subsequent elimination of psychoanalysis in Europe, the need for organizational decision making changed. Freud originally set up the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in 1910 because he said he

feared the abuses to which psycho-analysis would be subjected when it became popular. There should be some headquarters whose business it would be to declare: "All this nonsense is nothing to do with analysis; this is not psycho-analysis." At the sessions of the local groups (which together would constitute the international association) instruction should be given about how psycho-analysis was to be conducted and doctors should be trained, whose activities would then receive a kind of guarantee. (Freud, 1914, p. 43)

The fledgeling IPA was a means of centralizing power, describing what psychoanalysis was and what it was not, and embryonically establishing training standards. Other international associations do not do this, leaving the qualifications to national bodies (see

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Kirsner, 2001). Establishing the credentials of and separating who was and was not a psychoanalyst formed an enduring thread in Freud's life and work. Although he did not use the term "shibboleth," he was in effect saying, as he often did, that the special training centered through his own organizations would act as one.

In 1925 the Baad IPA Congress unanimously established the International Training Board, chaired by Max Eitingon, to set uniform standards for psychoanalytic training around the world. The Congress resolved the Board was to be "the central organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association for all questions connected with psycho-analytical training" (Wallerstein, 1998, p. 27). Modeled on the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, established in 1920, the Board would set the standards for those emigrating from Europe to the United States and beyond. The ensuing debates revealed deep rifts between the Americans, who wanted analysts to have medical qualifications and the Europeans who opposed that requirement. Then followed the well-known shenanigans between the Americans and Europeans in the "lay analysis" controversy so admirably chronicled by Wallerstein (1998). However, whether physician background was mandated or not, the idea of a central clearinghouse for monitoring and enforcing standards was set in place.

As the shibboleth of psychoanalytic education, the training analysis has helped to cement particular schools and closed attitudes in the candidate's unconscious. Education needs to be organically connected with critique and research, and the training analysis seen as a means to an end of furthering the attitude of what it takes to have a critical and inquiring mind. It involves promoting the virtues of scientific humility, dependent on observation and outcomes instead of faith and belief. This depends upon a facilitating and opening structure instead of one built upon the shibboleth of training analysis.

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